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abstract. This article challenges the view that, in accepting the  American loan and its
attendant commitments to international economic liberalization, the Labour party easily fell in behind
the Atlanticist approach to post-war trade and payments. It is suggested instead that Labour’s
sometimes seemingly paradoxical behaviour in office was driven, not only by the very tough economic
conditions it faced, but also by a fundamental contradiction inherent in its desire to ‘plan ’ at both
domestic and international levels. This contradiction – the ‘planning paradox ’ – is explored with
reference to pre-war and war-time developments, including Labour’s reactions to the Keynes and
White plans of , and to the Bretton Woods conference of . The decision to accept the US
loan, and with it the Bretton Woods agreements, is then examined within this context. Finally, an
assessment is made of whether, in this key area of policy, Labour’s pre- deliberations were effective
in preparing the party for the challenges it would face in government.
I
In the 1930s the Labour party domestic programme was based upon the
creation of a planned economy in Britain. The corollary of this policy at a world
level was ‘ international planning’, a concept which, though ill-defined, was
seen as an essential prerequisite of the international socialist commonwealth to
which the party aspired. During the war period, Anglo-American discussions
of international economic reconstruction were briefly seen by some Labour
thinkers as a building block towards the realization of such aspirations. These
hopes were not fulfilled: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank, to which the discussions gave rise, were hardly socialist
organizations. Nevertheless, Labour ministers, with the notable exception of
Ernest Bevin, were amongst the strongest supporters within the British
government of the agenda which helped create those institutions. Moreover, in
1945 the new Labour government accepted an American loan on terms which
one cabinet minister, Emanuel Shinwell, declared would make socialist
planning in Britain impossible. Indeed, Alan Booth has spoken of a Labour
‘volte face on foreign economic policy’ in the 1940s : ‘Despite the rhetoric of the
1930s on the death of free trade and the need for planning in this area, [Hugh]
* I am grateful to Peter Clarke, John Toye and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier
drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Dalton, [Hugh] Gaitskell and others easily fell in behind the Atlanticist
approach to the liberalization of postwar trade and payments.’"
In fact there was no such volte face. Rather, Labour’s behaviour in office was
driven by a paradox long implicit in its ideology. The party’s aspiration
towards international forms of planning – which suggested some surrender of
national sovereignty – was clearly at odds with its desire to extend state control
over Britain’s own national economy. As the American ambassador noted in
1950 after a conversation with Clement Attlee, there appeared to be a ‘real
inconsistency between socialism as a part of an international order, except as it
may be wholely and completely socialist, and the socialist state as an instrument
for internal planning of the economic life of the nation’.#
Fundamental as this contradiction was, however, Labour’s behaviour in
government cannot be explained purely in terms of ideology. The party’s
attitudes were to a great extent conditioned by, and had implications for,
Britain’s precarious economic circumstances, in the war years and after.
Moreover, not only did Labour ministers play an important part during the
war years in determining Britain’s attitude to the proposed new world
arrangements ; but, in power in their own right after the war, questions of
international economic co-operation presented them with profound practical
dilemmas. In and after 1945, the Labour government would be faced with the
question ofwhether political alliancewith theUnited States could be reconciled
with the pursuit of economic policies that America, Britain’s most powerful
creditor, in fact found objectionable. There was a risk that, if the Atlanticist
agenda on trade and payments was implemented in the short term, the British
economy, already in a parlous state, would be crippled – and yet Labour
ministers still needed to maintain the rhetoric of liberalization in order to
secure much-needed US assistance. Labour was in this way caught between
its prior aspirations towards ‘ international planning’, and the consequences of
the compromises such planning turned out to involve.
A deeper perspective on these dilemmas can be gained by examining the
Labour party’s own, often ambiguous, attitudes to international economic co-
operation in the years before 1945. Such questions have received little previous
attention from historians. Richard N. Gardner made certain observations on
the party’s war-time attitudes in his book Sterling-dollar diplomacy, but only on
the basis of published sources.$ The principal studies of the Labour party
during the war leave the issue to one side (albeit in the case of Stephen Brooke’s
Labour war: the Labour party’s economic ideas in the s consciously so).%
" Alan Booth, ‘How long are light years in British politics? ’, Twentieth Century British History, 7
(1996) pp. 1–27. See also Alan Booth, British economic policy, –: was there a Keynesian
revolution? (London, 1989), pp. 135–7.
# Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1648–54.
$ Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-dollar diplomacy in current perspective: the origins and prospects of our
international economic order (New York, 1980).
% Paul Addison The road to  (London, 1975) ; Kevin Jefferys, The Churchill coalition and war-
time politics, – (Manchester, 1991) ; Stephen Brooke, Labour’s war: the Labour party and the
Second World War (Oxford, 1992), p. 247.
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Discussions by Alec Cairncross and Jim Tomlinson concentrate on the 1945–51
period, as do Booth’s brief remarks.& The socialist historians Teddy Brett, Steve
Gilliatt, and Andrew Pople, who seek explicitly to demonstrate the desirability
of bilateralist trade in the modern world by reference to the experience of the
1940s, use the same restricted time-frame.’ There is, however, a considerable
quantity of published and unpublished material which makes a detailed
consideration of the pre-1945 issues possible. This consists partly of the Labour
party’s public programme and of its internal papers and policy documents,
partly of official sources, and partly of the writings and private papers of
Labour leaders and advisers.
The purpose of this article is to throw light on the Attlee government’s
dilemmas over international economic co-operation with reference to the
Labour party’s prior views, and to assess whether, in this key area of policy,
these pre-1945 deliberations were effective in preparing the party for the
challenges it would face in office. These dilemmas principally revolved around
proposals for economic liberalization, a term which encompassed several
issues : greater freedom of payments through multilateral settlements ; the
elimination of discrimination in foreign trade; tariff reductions ; and reductions
in non-tariff barriers (e.g. quantitative import restrictions). The aim is to
establish whether or not, by the end of the war, the Labour party had clear and
coherent policies on what action to take on these questions in the post-war
period. It will be argued that the course taken by the Attlee government was
a product both of contradictions in Labour’s own previous thinking, and of
the need to comply, albeit reluctantly and partially, and in the face of
awesomely difficult circumstances, with the wishes of a powerful ally.
First, it will be necessary to remark briefly on the party’s pre-war thought on
foreign trade and international planning. Next, early war-time socialist
thought on these issues will be considered. The party’s reaction to the
respective international post-war finance plans of John Maynard Keynes and
Harry Dexter White will then be looked at, followed by a consideration of its
approach to the Anglo-American negotiations which culminated in the Bretton
Woods agreement of 1944. The Attlee government’s approach to the post-war
American loan will be examined in the context of these earlier attitudes.
Finally, some brief suggestions will be made as to the extent to which that
government’s approach to international economic co-operation in the longer
term reflected, or departed from, war-time developments.
& Alec Cairncross, Years of recovery: British economic policy, – (London, 1985), pp. 61–272 ;
Jim Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy: the Attlee years, – (Cambridge, 1997),
pp. 1–47.
’ Teddy Brett, Steve Gilliatt, and Andrew Pople, ‘Planned trade, Labour party policy and U.S.
intervention: the successes and failures of post-war reconstruction’, History Workshop, 13 (1982),
pp. 130–42.
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II
After its catastrophic election defeat in 1931, the Labour party adopted policies
of economic planning based on nationalization of industry and physical
controls. Furthermore, as was argued in the party’s 1934 programme,
‘Planning and control in international life both postulate and follow from
national planning and socialised control of our national life ’. This ‘ inevitable
corollary’ had foreign policy implications in terms of support for collective
security in the form of the League of Nations, which in turn arose from beliefs
about the reasons for international conflict : ‘ the chaotic conditions arising out
of unbridled competition give rise to social injustice that imperils peace, and
the scramble for markets and fields for investment which are a direct cause of
war’. Therefore, just as in home policy the Labour party
would insist upon decisive control over the whole economic life of the country, so in
international policy it would press for international planning in economic and financial
questions… It would attack the disastrous economic nationalism of the present age by
working for an all-round lowering of tariffs, and their substitution by a system of
planned international exchange.(
These twin objectives, whilst ostensibly aimed at the same thing – the
achievement of order in economic life – were in fact in opposition to one
another. It is contradictory to seek to strengthen control of all aspects of one’s
own national economy whilst at the same time working to abolish ‘economic
nationalism’ in the world at large. International planning, if it is to be
meaningful, implies a surrender of national sovereignty. (One might suggest a
parallel at the national level : individual enterprises within the domestic
economy cannot at the same time have increased power to plan their own
affairs, and be subject to greater control by the state.) This ‘planning paradox’
remained an important and problematic feature of Labour’s thought in the
years to come.
But what of Labour’s more detailed policies? In his 1935 book Practical
socialism for Britain, Hugh Dalton, chairman of the party’s finance and trade
sub-committee, argued for the reduction or abolition of extant import duties,
although, ‘ in taking such action, we should seek reciprocity ’. Multilateral
agreements to achieve this would be worthwhile, but it was unlikely they would
be forthcoming. Therefore Britain should seek bilateral or perhaps group
agreements. And, like Attlee, the party’s leader after 1935, Dalton favoured
import and export boards.) But although Labour was committed to estab-
lishing such bodies, and in spite of the frequent sideswipes made against
‘economic nationalism’, the party’s approach to international trade was far
from resolved.* The National government’s adoption of tariffs and the
( Labour party, For socialism and peace (London, 1934), pp. 8–9, 11.
) Hugh Dalton, Practical socialism for Britain (London, 1935), pp. 299–308. Clement Attlee, The
will and the way to socialism (London, 1935), pp. 233–6.
* See Elizabeth Durbin, New Jerusalems: the Labour party and the economics of democratic socialism
(London, 1985), pp. 251–6.
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extension of the system of imperial preference meant that an incoming Labour
administration would be presented with a protectionist fait accompli. As the
Labour MP John Parker noted at a Fabian conference in 1936, ‘ the Party was
increasingly being driven to recognise the fact of economic nationalism and that
certain benefits had accrued from our protective system’. But on the other
hand, he went on to point out, the co-operative movement (a major retail
interest and a constituent part of the labour movement) was in favour of
unilateral free trade, and continued to put up a strong opposition to the
organization of foreign trade by import boards or similar bodies. Yet equally,
some trades unions were strong supporters of protection."!
These differing sectional interests aside, there was also disagreement amongst
the party’s intellectuals. Almost everyone could agree with Dalton that ‘Free
Trade, in the old sense, is a denial of planning; tariffs, in the old sense, are a
caricature of planning’."" But what was the alternative solution? Parker
himself argued that by means of trade agreements a Labour government
should try to build up a low tariff group; Hugh Gaitskell, a Dalton prote! ge! and
a future chancellor, responded that ‘ the idea of a low tariff group was nonsense
if your internal policy demanded, or if you already had, import boards. You
must in that case have a policy of trade agreements.’"# Therefore, by 1939, the
party was committed to a third course between free trade and protection, but
with no clear and detailed official proposals which could resolve the intellectual
and practical dilemmas this involved (and which, given the ‘planning
paradox’, were perhaps in any case insuperable). In the monetary sphere, the
aim of stabilizing exchange rates remained simply an aspiration. It was
therefore by no means obvious how planned international co-operation was to
be achieved.
III
There was, however, a shared Labour rhetoric on the benefits of international
economic action, upon which the coming of war brought a renewed emphasis.
International planning was seen not merely as the logical extension of socialist
planning at home, but as a means of eliminating the rivalries between capitalist
nations which, it was believed, had destroyed peace in the first place. In 1939
Attlee condemned ‘the cult of economic self-sufficiency’ and called for ‘Bold
economic planning on aworld scale ’ to meet the post-war situation."$ However,
in 1940, Aneurin Bevan MP, a firm advocate of world planning, did none the
less hint that such lofty aspirations might be accompanied by pitfalls : ‘ it will
not be possible for Britain to frame intelligent proposals for other countries
unless she is prepared to so adjust her own industries that they can be fitted into
the international pattern’."% Indeed, after 1945, the Labour government came
"! ‘Report of Conference on International Commercial Policy, 24–25 October 1936 ’, Fabian
Society papers J15}10. "" Dalton, Practical socialism, p. 304.
"# ‘Report of Conference on International Commercial Policy, 24–25 October 1936 ’, Fabian
Society papers J15}10.
"$ Clement Attlee et al., Labour’s aims in war and peace (London, 1940), p. 108.
"% Tribune, 11 Oct. 1940.
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to see that such self-imposed disbenefits might be a high price to pay for the
creation of a regulated world economic order.
Socialists did not dwell on such potential problems, although, from the very
beginning of the war, they discussed international (as well as domestic) post-
war reconstruction extensively. Within days of taking up his post as minister of
labour in Churchill’s government in May 1940, Ernest Bevin was being
criticized, presumably by Tories, ‘ for being a little too much interested in the
world after the war is won’."& And in June 1941, Arthur Greenwood, the
Labour minister in charge of reconstruction questions, was pressing for
Anglo-American discussions on post-war policy."’ Nevertheless, Labour’s
internal considerations of such issues remained unsystematic until July of that
year, when the party’s central committee on problems of post-war recon-
struction met for the first time. This committee divided its work between
‘ internal ’ policy and ‘ international trade’, suggesting that similar importance
was attributed to both areas."( Naturally, consideration of the latter sphere
deserved to be influenced by ongoing world events ; and indeed, two Anglo-US
agreements were soon signed with major repercussions for Labour’s in-
ternational economic policy.
On 14 August 1941, the British and American governments issued the
Atlantic Charter, a communique! of aims in which the two allies stated their
‘desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the
economic field with the object of assuring, for all, improved labour standards,
economic development and social security ’.") And on 23 February 1942,
Britain committed herself to article vii of the mutual aid agreement, whereby
as ‘consideration’ for American lend-lease aid, she agreed ‘to the elimination
of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and the
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers ’."* In the short term, the Atlantic
Charter further stimulated Labour’s own exploration of international re-
construction issues ; and in the long term, article vii would create problems and
embarrassments for Churchill’s coalition government, and, after 1945, for
Attlee’s Labour government too.
The likelihood of this was not recognized at the time, however, as relief at the
prospect of immediate US aid erased possible concerns about the longer-run
consequences of its acceptance. Yet amongst socialists there was, nevertheless,
increasing recognition of the difficulties involved in international co-operation.
The international relationships sub-committee of Labour’s central committee
on reconstruction, discussing the objective, contained in the Atlantic Charter,
‘ to free all the men in all the lands from fear and want’, acknowledged this
would not be easy. ‘Constructive economic international planning can only
"& Thomas Jones, A diary with letters, – (London, 1954), p. 467.
"’ L. S. Pressnell, External economic policy since the war, i : The post-war financial settlement (London,
1986), p. 33. "( Brooke, Labour’s war, p. 105.
") The Labour party was sufficiently enamoured of the Atlantic Charter to reproduce its text in
full in the policy document The old world and the new society (London, 1942).
"* Cited in D. E. Moggridge, Maynard Keynes: an economist’s biography (London, 1992), p. 668.
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succeed if peace is assured’, the committee argued, ‘political stability is the
foundation of economic prosperity ’. However, the political difficulties were
minimized and the economic ones emphasized. The experience of the League
of Nations had taught lessons about how (or indeed how not) to achieve
political stability, ‘But with regard to international economic problems, we
stand now almost where we stood with regard to political problems in
1919…we are still largely in the dark about the technical difficulties to be
overcome’.#!
In an accompanying note, Dalton sketched out some ‘rather random
thoughts ’ of his own. He noted that the Soviet Union had not, in pre-war days,
had a significant impact on the rest of the world’s economy. ‘If, however,
Russia chooses to expand her foreign trade [post-war] there will be certain
advantages ’, he argued. ‘Some international trade at least will be planned
from the start and this will be useful in countering capitalistic instabilities…
Nevertheless, since there is so much in doubt about Russia’s future economic
policy, the first aim must be to secure Anglo-American co-operation.’ Such co-
operation should aim at creating a common monetary and investment policy,
in order to secure and maintain full employment of resources ; if possible,
Russia should be involved too. This policy, he claimed, if successful, would
make the problems of international trade much easier to handle ; but this would
still be a knotty problem:
Clearly the days of individualist Free Trade are past ; so, for that matter, are the days
of individualist protection. It is certain that, in some degrees, trade between countries
will be regulated by Agreements between Governments…The easiest type of
Agreement to negotiate is obviously a simple bilateral Agreement…But bilateral
agreements are certainly less conducive to International Economic well-being than
multilateral agreements in which a number of countries are involved, and no attempt
is made to equalise the balance of trade between any two countries alone.
Therefore, only through multilateral agreements ‘ is it conceivable that the
most sensible forms of International Economic specialisation be adopted’. As in
the thirties, Dalton recognized that such agreements were difficult to negotiate.
But this did not quell his aspirations : ‘ the ultimate goal must, I think, be a kind
of supreme International Economic Planning Body, which would attempt to
co-ordinate the various Agreements between Governments and producers, and
would all the time be suggesting ways of improving agreements so as to secure
a more sensible distribution of resources ’.#"
These views were in line with those Dalton had previously held (although he
was now somewhat more convinced of the practicalities of multilateral trade).
At the same time, it is clear that he was indeed moving towards a more
#! International relationships sub-committee, ‘Note and preliminary questions on post-war
international economic policy’, Oct. 1941 RDR 4, Labour Party Archive, National Museum of
Labour History, Manchester (LPA).
#" Hugh Dalton, ‘Notes on international economic policy in the post-war world’, Oct. 1941
RDR 4, LPA.
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Atlanticist approach. This was not a question of reneging on previous
principles. Rather, his emphasis on Anglo-American co-operation was clearly
based on a realpolitik assessment of the likely relative post-war economic power
of Britain’s main allies ; Britain’s dependence, for the rest of the war, on
American aid, would only make the point more clearly. It is not clear exactly
how drastic the powers of Dalton’s proposed international planning
organization were to be. But other Labour thinkers, particularly on the left,
had far-reaching ambitions in this sphere. The Hungarian-born economist
Thomas Balogh wrote that ‘The production of the main foodstuffs and raw
materials must be planned internationally.’## And in 1942, another internal
party memorandum argued – in another apparent example of the ‘planning
paradox’ – that ‘The state must nationally maintain and extend its war-time
powers of determining what is to be produced and at what price it is to be
distributed; internationally it must yield some of its attributes of economic
sovereignty to an international authority which must have the power to plan
and control production and distribution.’#$ This emphasis on the physical
control of production and consumption by a body with supra-national powers
was far removed from the American free-enterprise viewpoint – and yet, as the
logic of Dalton’s argument suggested, American collaboration was a pre-
requisite to the success of any international scheme. In due course, the processes
of Anglo-American negotiation opened a division between the advocates of
compromise in order to gain agreement, and the die-hard socialist planners.
(Similarly, in 1945 Labour politicians argued over whether or not the benefits
of American aid were outweighed by the conditions attached to it.) For the
time being, however, a level of apparent consensus persisted. Labour’s reaction
to the respective international post-war finance plans of Keynes and Harry
Dexter White gave strong evidence of this.
IV
Keynes had first proposed an international currency union in September 1941,
but, before finally emerging as the government white paper Proposals for an
international clearing union in April 1943, his plan went through many drafts.#%
The plan’s purpose was to create a balance of payments equilibrium between
all nations, without poorer countries having to undertake internal deflationary
policies in order to achieve this. Adopted by the Treasury as the basis for its
proposals for post-war monetary arrangements, the plan would eventually be
offered to the Americans as the ‘consideration’ to which they were entitled
under article vii.#& As the scheme went through successive versions, the major
## Thomas Balogh, ‘A statement on international economic reconstruction’, Oct. 1941 RDR
6, LPA.
#$ International relationships sub-committee (economic section), ‘A long-term international
economic policy’, Aug. 1942 RDR 121, LPA. #% Cmnd. 6437, 7 Apr. 1943.
#& Moggridge, Maynard Keynes, p. 676.
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input from the Labour side of the coalition came from Ernest Bevin, who would
prove to be persistently sceptical of the merits of the various proposals for
international monetary co-operation. When put before the war cabinet’s
reconstruction problems committee on 31 March 1942, Bevin made up his
mind that Keynes’s ideas ‘really took us back to the automatic gold standard
with just a little more rope before the poor unfortunate debtor was hanged’.#’
Keynes met Bevin to discuss his objections, and reported to colleagues :
He is afraid that the new scheme, though giving a certain amount of leeway, might
result in the last resort, in a return to the evils of the old automatic gold standard, and
he remembers that that, in the last analysis, was what drove him, against his natural
inclinations, to fight the General Strike. I told him that I thought few or no responsible
persons contemplated the use of the old weapons, deflation enforced by dear money,
resulting in unemployment, as a means of restoring international equilibrium, and that,
if the new scheme was to break down, this would not be the remedy which anyone would
seek to adopt. He replied that, if this was made perfectly clear, he would feel very much
happier about it all.#(
Accordingly, it was made clear that the measures which a country might be
asked to undertake if it had a substantial debit balance ‘do not include a
deflationary policy, enforced by dear money and similar measures, having the
effect of causing unemployment’.#)
V
The Keynes plan, after yet further revisions, was finally published a year later,
on 7 April 1943. On the same day the official American proposals were also
published, which had been prepared by Harry Dexter White, assistant
secretary to the US Treasury. The White plan proposed the creation of two
separate institutions : a stabilization fund and a bank for reconstruction and
development. The fund, on which discussion for the time being focused, would
have resources of $5 billion, which would be subscribed by member countries
in gold, local currency, and securities in accordance with quotas determined by
a complex formula. These resources would be available to countries in
temporary balance of payments difficulties ; in return, member nations’ rights
to maintain exchange controls and to vary exchange rates would be limited.
Moreover, domestic policy would be subject to fund supervision (based on a
four-fifths majority decision).#*
On a visit to Britain in 1935, White had met both Dalton and the then
Labour party leader George Lansbury (and had also met Keynes for the first
time). The two men had told him then that Labour was against a return to the
#’ Ibid., p. 678 ; Ernest Bevin to Anthony Eden 24 Apr. 1942, Bevin papers 3}2, Churchill
College, Cambridge.
#( Donald Moggridge, ed., The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, xxv : Activities, –:
shaping the post-war world: the clearing union (London, 1980) (henceforward JMK xxv), p. 142.
#) Ibid., p. 143. #* Ibid. ; Moggridge, Maynard Keynes, pp. 685–7.
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gold standard.$! Eight years later, socialists and others feared that the White
plan amounted to exactly this. F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, who had been
financial secretary to the Treasury from 1929 to 1931, and who was now an
important Labour spokesman outside the government, told the Commons that
‘ the American plan proposes in fact a full return to the gold standard…I
certainly could never support such proposals ’.$" His criticism was misleading.
Under the scheme, only the dollar would be pegged to gold, and other
currencies would in turn be pegged to the dollar, subject to adjustment in
specified circumstances, thus avoiding the anarchy of competitive devaluation.
As Keynes put it later,
I have never heard [White] express the opinion…that exchange rates should be fixed,
subject to the rarest and most difficult exceptions, just as they once used to be, in terms
of gold. The chief matter at issue has been a quite different one, namely whether
countries should surrender to an international body the right to decide whether the
circumstances are such as to justify a change, or whether they should retain at least some
measure of discretion in their own hands.$#
But concerns about excessive exchange rate rigidity, and the possibility that
debtor nations might be compelled to take deflationary measures if they wished
to devalue, were immediately linked to the psychologically significant fact that
the White plan involved a gold subscription: it became difficult for some
politicians, Conservative as well as Labour, to rid themselves of the idea that
the plan involved a ‘return to gold’.
Thus, although Labour politicians and thinkers did not give the Keynes plan
unqualified acceptance, they unanimously praised it at the expense of the
White plan.$$ (There was also perhaps an element of patriotic support for the
home-grown initiative.) An internal party memorandum noted the contrasts
between the schemes. The Keynes plan was based on trade levels and there was
no preponderant power of veto; whereas in White’s scheme gold played an
important part, and the US, given the size of its proposed national quota, ‘ is
given in effect a veto, i.e. no 4}5ths majority decision can be taken without it ’.
The British plan placed responsibility for adjustment on creditors as well as
debtors ; the American plan placed it only on debtors. The British plan allowed
currency blocs, and, unlike its counterpart, aimed specifically at reducing
tariffs. Moreover, ‘Although the Keynes Scheme is not related to any post war
trade plan, it makes it quite clear the dependence of the scheme on world
collaboration in trade’ ; whereas, the ‘main fault ’ of the White plan ‘appears
to be that, whilst no evidence appears of a clear understanding on the part of
$! David Rees, Harry Dexter White: a study in paradox (London and Basingstoke, 1974), pp. 59–60.
$" Parliamentary Debates 5th series House of Commons vol. 389 12 May 1943 col. 666.
$# Donald Moggridge, ed., The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, xxvi : Activities,
–: shaping the post-war world: Bretton Woods and reparations (London, 1980) (henceforward
JMK xxvi), p. 34.
$$ See Tribune, 9 Apr. 1943 and 16 Apr. 1943 ; New Statesman and Nation, 10 Apr. 1943 ; Thomas
Balogh, ‘The currency plans and international economic relations, Political Quarterly, 41 (1943),
pp. 343–56.
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the U.S. that their Tariff policy must go, they expect everyone to return to the
gold standard, i.e. the stage is set for a repetition of the errors of the past ’.$%
VI
The charge that the US plan took no account of trade policy was perhaps, like
the ‘gold standard’ one, unfair.$& However, no American proposals on this
subject were yet forthcoming. An important British initiative on this, though,
was already in the pipeline; it was written by James Meade, of the economic
section of the cabinet secretariat. Meade had advised the Labour party on
economic questions in pre-war days, although he saw himself as a ‘Lib}Lab’
and not as a ‘real ’ socialist.$’ He had, moreover, taken a long-standing interest
in international economic co-operation, and in July 1942 proposed an
international commercial union in order to complement Keynes’s clearing
union scheme. Meade argued that Britain, whose trade in the past had been
largely of a multilateral character, would benefit from a general reduction of
barriers and restrictions in international markets, and from the removal of
those discriminations and rigidly bilateral bargains that removed the
opportunities for multilateral trading. Multilateralism and the removal of
trade restrictions ‘do not, however, imply laissez-faire, and are in no way
incompatible with a system of state trading’. Membership of the proposed
union would bring the obligation not to extend preferences or other price
advantages to any other member country without extending it to all countries.
Discrimination of any kind would be allowed against nations which had not
joined the union, and were therefore themselves not pledged not to discriminate
in turn. Also, ‘discrimination of a defined and moderate degree in favour of a
recognised political or geographical grouping of states ’ would be permitted,
which ‘would thus permit the continuation of a moderate degree of Imperial
Preference’.$(
Having completed his paper, Meade sought help from his pre-war Fabian
colleague Hugh Gaitskell. Gaitskell was now personal assistant to Dalton, who
had recently been appointed president of the board of trade. Gaitskell redrafted
the commercial union proposal and passed it on to his boss. Dalton noted:
‘This is a good paper. I agree generally with the policy proposed, though many
points of detail are of first class importance – and first class controversial
value.’$) Clearly, Meade’s ideas appealed to him as representing a ‘middle
$% Post-war finance sub-committee, ‘Some contrasts in the ‘‘Keynes ’’ and ‘‘White ’’ schemes ’,
May 1943 RDR 211, LPA. $& See Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 139.
$’ Durbin, New Jerusalems, p. 197.
$( Susan Howson, ed., The collected papers of James Meade, iii : International economics (London,
1988), pp. 27–35.
$) James Meade and Hugh Gaitskell, ‘Post-war commercial policy: a proposal for an
international commercial union’, 24 Aug. 1942, Dalton papers ii(B)7}4, British Library of
Political and Economic Science, London (BLPES); Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London, 1985),
pp. 399–400.
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way’ between pure free trade and the excesses of protectionism and
bilateralism; his pre-war views had not changed, but he now had a practical
scheme to put forward which embodied them. At his instigation, an
interdepartmental committee was established to examine the questions at
hand. The committee’s report, which favoured multilateral negotiation of a
multilateral trading convention, proved controversial.$* Accordingly, in
consultation with Attlee, Dalton prepared a memorandum which was put to
the war cabinet in April 1943, summarizing three policy alternatives. ‘View A’
argued that a general clearance of trade barriers was particularly in Britain’s
interest, and could best be secured by a multilateral commercial convention of
the kind suggested by Meade. ‘View B’ similarly favoured multilateralism, but
argued that Britain should not bind itself to limitations on quantitative import
restrictions which might be essential to maintain its balance of payments, or, in
the immediate future, give an international body the right to pass judgement
on its commercial policy. According to ‘View C’, import restrictions, the
balance of payments question aside, were a sound and permanent instrument
of national planning.%! The Labour ministers at this time favoured view A; but
their own government’s actions after the war would be far more in line with
view B, with actual progress towards multilateral trade being made slowly and
with reluctance.
In the meantime, however, Attlee and Dalton were in the multilateralist
vanguard. They were, however, unable to prevent the cabinet’s discussion of
views A, B, and C (on 8 April) descending into mild chaos. Churchill gave a
rambling monologue – either because he did not understand the issues at hand,
or, as Thomas Johnston, the Labour secretary of state for Scotland, suggested,
out of cunning, hoping to mislead and entrap the opponents of view A. At one
point, after a discussion on buffer stocks had been proceeding for some minutes,
the prime minister said, ‘I thought you said Butter Scotch…I am getting very
hard of hearing.’ Nevertheless, the meeting in the end determined to accept an
amended version of view A. A cabinet committee was established (on which
Dalton was to sit) to produce a solution in line with this. Dalton noted that ‘All
this looks like a remarkable success.’ But the policy would subsequently become
mired in ministerial controversy – which in time, it seems, served to weaken the
Labour ministers’ commitment to multilateral trade.%"
VII
Both Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps (at this time an independent MP, and the
minister for aircraft production) had been insistent that the countries of the
empire should be consulted before an approach was made to the United States ;
$* Pressnell, External economic policy, i, pp. 101–6.
%! London, Public Record Office (PRO) CAB 66}35 WP(43)136.
%" John Barnes and David Nicholson, eds., The empire at bay: the Leo Amery diaries, –
(London, 1988), pp. 880–1 ; Ben Pimlott, ed., The Second World War diary of Hugh Dalton, –
(London, 1986), pp. 577–9 ; PRO CAB 65}34 WM50(43).
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and when the cabinet committee reported back, on 22 April, this was agreed
to.%# By the end of July, the cabinet was ready to open discussions with the US
on all subjects covered by article vii, including commercial policy, in order to
arrive at an agenda for further talks.%$ There were further cabinet discussions
about the line the delegation to the US would take. Bevin and Dalton argued
that the proposed stabilization fund should not buy or sell gold or currencies.
Dalton said ‘he hoped our representatives would do their best to ensure that the
scheme was based on gold to the minimum possible extent ’%% – although he
privately recorded that he thought the rate of exchange more important than
either the amount of gold to be subscribed, or the currencies in which the fund
could deal.%& According to Leo Amery, the Conservative secretary of state for
India, moreover, ‘Bevin…voiced a very sensible fear lest any fixed Exchange
should interfere with social policy. He added that it would not do to have 19th
century America preventing the 20th century in this country. On this I sent
him a little note of congratulation.’%’
The Labour ministers found general support for their views, although,
despite reservations, it was decided that Britain would if necessary agree to a
12–5 per cent gold subscription in order to reach accord with the United States.
Attlee had been told by William Piercy, one of his advisers as deputy prime
minister, that ‘ the general line of making every possible concession to the
Americans, both in substance and in form, is wise ’.%( The cabinet clearly felt
similarly, as further significant efforts to meet US opinion were also made.
These included the acceptance both of a smaller fund than had originally been
envisaged in the clearing union proposals (with the American commitment
limited to $2–3 billion), and of the idea that voting arrangements should bear
some relation to national quotas.%) The British delegates, with the foreign office
minister Richard Law at their head, were instructed accordingly.
These developments led, in some Labour quarters, to profound optimism.
Evan Durbin, another of Attlee’s advisers, told him
I am enormously impressed by the really remarkable success in the field of International
Economic Cooperation. I had always assumed that this would be one of our most obstinate
problems but we seem to be moving faster here than anywhere else… I do not suggest
that all is well – there is still a lively and, in my view, dangerous distrust of the United
States over these matters – but, taking the subject as a whole, the record is startlingly
encouraging.%*
The progress of the Law mission to some extent bore this buoyant view out. On
commercial policy, the British proposals provided the framework for discussion,
and were used as the basis of the unpublished joint Anglo-American report of
%# PRO CAB 65}34 WM(43)58. %$ Ibid., 65}35 WM(43)106.
%% Ibid., 65}35 WM121(43). %& Pimlott, ed., Dalton war diary, p. 629.
%’ Barnes and Nicholson, eds., Leo Amery diaries, p. 937.
%( ‘Monetary clearing union’, memo by William Piercy to Attlee, 1 Sept. 1943, Piercy papers
8}9, BLPES. %) Moggridge, Maynard Keynes, p. 723.
%* ‘Review of ‘‘ reconstruction’’ ’, memo by Durbin to Attlee, 21 Oct. 1943, Piercy papers 8}9.
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the discussions – although it appeared that the US would only reduce her
own tariffs substantially in exchange for the virtual abolition of imperial and
other preferences.&! Progress was also made on the stabilization fund, the
British accepting that it would take the form proposed in the White plan
(notably, it was felt within the UK delegation that Attlee and Dalton would
support this, but that Bevin would not).&" However, by way of concession to the
British, greater exchange elasticity was ensured, and the right of withdrawal
from the fund was recognized. Further outstanding differences were resolved
over the coming months.&#
But despite the progress of the experts towards agreement, Law’s favourable
report on the negotiations led to disagreement amongst ministers. This
document, which L. S. Pressnell has dubbed the Washington principles, was
circulated to the cabinet on 17 December.&$ Amongst Conservatives, devotees
of imperial preference like Leo Amery naturally opposed it ; and Lord
Beaverbrook in particular argued that the monetary proposals meant a return
to the gold standard. But some of the strongest backing for the results of the
Anglo-American discussions came from Labour ministers. In the first of two
cabinets on the issue in February, Attlee recorded his support for Law’s views,
before having to leave the meeting early. Dalton ‘thought the proposals would
help clear the road for our exports in the transitional period, and regarded
them as representing the most hopeful line of progress. He was prepared to
support them on the currency side, since he regarded them as the opposite of
any reversion to the gold standard.’ Herbert Morrison, the Labour home
secretary, expressed his general agreement with the Washington principles :
‘On sentimental grounds we should all of us favour Empire Trade. But this
country could not live solely on it, nor could the Dominions live on trade
merely with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions.’ (Fondness for the
empire does not, therefore, seem to have affected Morrison’s practical
judgement on this issue; nor that of other Labour ministers.) Bevin, always
difficult on the gold standard point, had, accordingly, to Dalton ‘been warned
that if he makes a row today he will be isolated along with Beaverbrook and the
Bank of England… This warning has had its effect.’ He thus did not venture
a firm opinion, although he did suggest that it might be possible to impose
import restrictions against members of the fund who did not enforce the
minimum working conditions laid down by the International Labour
Organization. Churchill summed up the discussion in favour of ‘proceeding
with a policy generally on the lines discussed at Washington’. A committee on
external economic policy was set up, to determine the line to be taken by
&! Pressnell, External economic policy, i, pp. 118–19, 129.
&" Susan Howson and Donald Moggridge, eds., The wartime diaries of Lionel Robbins and James
Meade, – (Basingstoke, 1990), p. 124.
&# Roy Harrod, The life of John Maynard Keynes (London, 1951), p. 570 ; Gardner, Sterling-dollar
diplomacy, pp. 111–21 ; Moggridge, Maynard Keynes, pp. 725–8 ; Pressnell, External economic policy, i,
pp. 116–26.
&$ PRO CAB 66}44 WP(43)559 (revise) ; Pressnell, External economic policy, i, p. 125.
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officials in discussions with the Dominions and India, on which Dalton
amongst others was to sit.&%
The majority of this committee, in spite of Beaverbrook’s ‘great skill in
obstruction’, produced a favourable majority report.&& This was presented to
the cabinet on 23 February. Attlee, Dalton, and Morrison again supported the
Washington principles, Attlee arguing, ‘ it would be impossible to maintain the
sterling area in the form which it had existed before the war…to ignore the
attitude of the U.S. in this matter, would lead to disaster ’.&’ But, as Dalton
recorded, the proceedings turned into something of a nightmare:
Clearly many ministers, including the P.M., have not even read our short report…the
Beaver begins to shout headlines, ‘It is a gold fund’…‘We are giving up our economic
empire ’…The whole thing develops into the worst pandemonium I have ever seen in
Cabinet. Towards the end, four or five ministers are often shouting at once.&(
The meeting ended inconclusively.
At a further cabinet on 14 April it was agreed, under US pressure, that an
Anglo-American joint statement on the principles of an international monetary
fund should be issued at an early date ; but this was subject to the proviso that
‘while His Majesty’s Government regarded the scheme as a valuable
contribution to our objectives in the field of international trade, His Majesty’s
Government were in no way committed to it ’. (Bevin, for one, ‘ still had an
uneasy fear that in some way the scheme would anchor us to gold’.) The
publication on 22 April 1944 of the Anglo-American Joint statement by experts on
the establishment of an international monetary fund none the less contributed to the
rapid progress on the monetary side which culminated in the successful
conclusion of the Bretton Woods conference in July.&)
The commercial plan was not to be published, however. Dalton argued that
the time was not yet ripe: the scheme was not in such an advanced state of
preparation as the monetary one, further consultation with the dominions was
desirable, and, furthermore, the Americans were not pressing for publication.&*
This was plausible reasoning, although Amery suggested that in fact Dalton
‘was frightened by the course of the discussion’, and was perhaps influenced to
a degree by the arguments of the critics.’! (Indeed, a few days later Dalton
remarked in the Commons that ‘Imperial Preference has been of quite definite
value both to us and the Dominions ’, a judgement apparently based on
practical grounds rather than on any imperial sentiment.)’" At any rate,
progress on commercial policy was stymied, with Anglo-US talks not
resuming until November 1944.
&% PRO CAB 65}41 WM(44)18 (and confidential annex in CAB 65}45) ; Pimlott, ed., Dalton
war diary, pp. 704–6. && Pimlott, ed., Dalton war diary, pp. 706–8.
&’ PRO CAB 65}41 WM(44)24 (and confidential annex in CAB 64}45).
&( Pimlott, ed., Dalton war diary, pp. 710–12. &) Cmnd. 6519, 22 Apr. 1944.
&* PRO CAB 65}42 WM(44)49 (and confidential annex in CAB 65}46) ; Pimlott, ed., Dalton
war diary, pp. 735–6. ’! Barnes and Nicholson, eds., Leo Amery diaries, p. 978.
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VIII
In parallel with developments in Whitehall, Dalton was making the Labour
party’s own official policy on future international arrangements. The vehicle
for this was the document Full employment and financial policy, published in April
1944 in anticipation of the government’s own employment white paper. It was
drafted mainly by Dalton himself, with some assistance from Gaitskell and
Durbin. The document saw schemes of international co-operation as the
complement of demand management and economic planning at home:
we feel sure that we can and should enter into an agreement with the dominions, the
United States, Russia and other Governments, to control and raise the purchasing
power of the world, to keep it constantly at a level that will give full employment
everywhere, and to guarantee the stability of the principal rates of exchange without
any fear that it will limit our freedom to maintain full employment at home.
Moreover, Dalton’s faith in a liberal commercial policy was expressed again.
The document argued for ‘ the progressive and mutual reduction in tariffs and
other impediments, such as import quotas ’. Nevertheless, the limits to this
commitment were clear:
This emphatically does not mean that there should be any return to laissez-faire or ‘ free
trade’ in the capitalist sense. Socialists believe in the planning of imports and exports
and the present apparatus of control – foreign exchange control, import programmes,
allocation of scarce materials for the export trade – should remain in existence. War
time arrangements for bulk purchase, through State agencies, of food-stuffs and raw
materials, should continue. State trading, as the war has proved, brings great benefits
to the peoples. We must not let this Socialist advance be halted or turned back.’#
But was this really in the spirit of article vii? Certainly, the Washington
principles accepted ‘that conditions created by the war will tend to result in
State trading on a more extensive scale than theretofore ’, and that therefore
‘methods and arrangements between private-enterprise countries and State-
trading countries…should be such as to take account of this situation in order
that the interests of both may be harmonised’.’$ Yet it would surely be difficult
– although perhaps not impossible – to achieve this in a way that guaranteed
non-discrimination. Thus, given that Labour’s state-trading ideas were the
corollary of its desire to create a planned economy at home, it is clear that the
party’s commitment to commercial liberalization abroad would complicate
the realization of its domestic aspirations. For, as ‘Otto’ Clarke, a Treasury
civil servant, would note two years later, when faced with trying to put such a
policy into practice, to attempt to combine a liberal international economic
policy with an internal economy based on planning meant venturing into a
‘theological maze’.’%
’# Labour party, Full employment and financial policy (London, 1944), pp. 6–7.
’$ PRO CAB 66}44 WP(43)559 (revise).
’% R. W. B. Clarke diary, 6 Mar. 1946, R. W. B. Clarke papers 25, Churchill College,
Cambridge.
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IX
Those who saw themselves as the guardians of socialist theology were, indeed,
eager to denounce the proposed new international arrangements, which
Dalton supported, as incompatible with the main tenets of their beliefs. Balogh
was the intellectual chief of this group; he argued for a financial plan that
would ‘permit single countries to maintain full employment irrespective of the
consequences of this policy on the balance of their international payments ’,
and, seeing that the monetary plan did not provide for this, he and his followers
sought a bloc of planned economies which would pursue bilateral agreements
with one another.’& During the Commons debate in May 1944 on the
Anglo-American joint statement, Emanuel Shinwell, at this time a maverick
backbencher, followed these arguments closely. He claimed that trade
expansion and full employment depended on planning – and having a plan
meant ‘ that this country…should be able at any time, irrespective of any
international consideration, financial or otherwise, to enter into reciprocal
agreements with any country’. The Labour party ‘believe in planned trade,
orderly trade, bulk purchase ’ ; but ‘If you accept the principle of non-
discrimination in relation to international exchange, it is bound to affect the
position when you come to make reciprocal trading agreements which are,
essentially and fundamentally, based on discrimination’.’’
Was this argument, which was later central to Shinwell’s opposition to the
US loan, correct? John Anderson, the chancellor, claimed that ‘ there is
nothing in the [monetary] plan which will prevent us from entering into
reciprocal trade agreements with other countries or groups of countries ’ ;’(
Keynes pointed out too that ‘ the monetary proposals…involve no
commitments about commercial arrangements ’.’) But, as Gardner has written,
‘Where, in all this discussion, was the recognition of Britain’s solemn obligations
under Article Seven?’’* The answer, it seems, is that, owing to ‘the
tergiversations of the Cabinet ’ on commercial policy, both Keynes and the
chancellor had to keep their own counsel on this point. But surely, as Keynes
argued privately, even if, as he himself believed, commercial bilateralism and
monetary multilateralism could be reconciled in a technical sense, that did not
mean that the adoption of the former by Britain would ‘not cause trouble and
misunderstanding with the Americans ’. Indeed, ‘I am sure it will ’.(! For, as
Durbin and Piercy advised Attlee, this would amount to ‘declaring a trade war
on the United States ’.(" This was a consideration that Shinwell did not address
’& Thomas Balogh et al., The economics of full employment: six studies in applied economics (Oxford,
1944), p. 159, cited in Gardner, Sterling-dollar diplomacy, p. 122.
’’ Parliamentary Debates 5th series House of Commons vol. 399 10 May 1944 col. 1981.
’( Ibid., col. 2045. ’) JMK xxvi, p. 8.
’* Gardner, Sterling-dollar diplomacy, p. 128. (! JMK xxvi, p. 26.
(" ‘The International Monetary Fund – future criticisms’, n.d. [1944], attached to ‘Bretton
Woods Conference’, Piercy and Durbin to Attlee, 25}1}45, Piercy papers 8}9.
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directly – but his subsequent stance on the post-war loan suggests that he was
prepared to see Britain pay an extremely painful price if so doing was necessary
in order to resist the Atlanticist economic agenda.
The other contributions to the Commons debate gave Keynes little more
comfort than Shinwell’s did. The economist recorded that he ‘spent seven
hours in the cursed Gallery, lacerated in mind and body’ listening to the
speeches, blaming an ‘unreasoning wave of isolationism and Anti-
Americanism’ for their generally critical tone.(# The bilateralist argument
gained support even from the Tory benches, notably in the arguments of Bob
Boothby; and the ‘gold standard’ criticism was also in evidence. On the
Labour side, the left-winger G. R. Strauss warned that in its present form the
monetary fund would be
disastrous to world trade, to the prosperity of this country and to [the] Anglo-American
relationship. It is highly desirable that we should have the utmost co-operation in
economic affairs with the United States. It is quite a different thing to bind ourselves to
the United States with chains that are likely to become burdensome and possibly
intolerable.($
Therefore, apart from the speech of the chancellor himself, almost the only
crumb of comfort that Keynes could extract from the debate was Pethick-
Lawrence’s contribution, upon which he sent the old veteran a note of
congratulation.(% But Pethick-Lawrence’s endorsement of the scheme was
hardly a model of enthusiasm. Declaring that the greatest risk in non-co-
operation would be a return to bilateral trade, which he opposed, he argued:
there are grave risks in any scheme, and there are certain grave risks unresolved in the
present scheme…[the chancellor] should prosecute his enquiries and should make it
quite clear that it would be disastrous if we got tied up to gold; [and] that it would be
disastrous if a board of management, either incompetent or unwise or one-sided, were
to rule this Fund.(&
The Commons passed the motion at hand, which merely supported further
international consultation on the scheme, without enthusiasm. Keynes
predicted: ‘The thing will grind along. We shall produce a further version and
when at a later date the House is eventually faced with the alternative of
turning their back on this sort of thing and begin to appreciate what that
means, I have not the slightest doubt that they will change their minds.’(’ As
a prediction of the Labour government’s final attitude in 1945, this proved
extremely prescient.
(# JMK xxvi, p. 3.
($ Parliamentary Debates 5th series House of Commons vol. 399, 10 May 1944, col. 2008.
(% JMK xxvi, pp. 3–4.
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X
The conclusion of the Bretton Woods conference, at which the forty-four
nations represented agreed on the creation of an international monetary fund
and an international bank, clearly provided a huge fillip for the cause of
international co-operation; it was, as Attlee noted, ‘a striking success which
owed much to Keynes ’.(( But the agreement was subject to ratification by the
individual countries. Much delay was occasioned in Britain by internal
Treasury controversy over the precise nature of the convertibility obligations
which had been agreed at Bretton Woods. On the Labour side, Bevin, in
cabinet, continued to express scepticism about the entire scheme, thus earning
himself further congratulations from Amery.() The cabinet as a whole was
sufficiently nervous of a negative reaction to the agreement that it allowed no
further parliamentary debate. Commercial policy, too, made slow progress.
This was largely because of long, drawn-out attempts to accommodate the
views of the ministry of agriculture ; but equally, there is no evidence of the
Labour ministers, who perhaps were sensitive to party opinion on the point,
pursuing the multilateralist case with their previous vigour. By September,
Dalton himself seemedunsurewhether or not bulk purchase could be reconciled
with the commitment to non-discrimination; and Thomas Johnston argued for
(discriminatory) quantitative import restrictions. Moreover, pressures from
within Congress now led to a partial American retreat from multilateralism. At
Anglo-American talks in the winter of 1944–5, US officials produced a draft
charter for an international trade organization (ITO); but under it, Britain
would be expected to cut tariffs and preferences and abandon import controls,
against ‘a mere halving’ of American tariffs.(*
American determination to retain a high level of tariffs would subsequently
fuel growing British doubts about the ITO. Nevertheless, there were at this
time some Labour devotees of the proposed international settlement. But as
two of them, William Piercy and Evan Durbin, told Attlee in January 1945,
the controversy over this subject is being conducted in a very curious fashion. The
proposal to set up an International Monetary Fund is being attacked by the odd
Parliamentary combination of Shinwell and Boothby, inspired by a number of
Hungarian refugee economists (particularly Balogh), and supported by the extreme
individualists among the financial journalists ! Nevertheless, this paradoxical hotch-
potch is exercising a considerable influence on Parliamentary opinion, particularly in
the Labour Party, because of our deep and reasonable fear of ‘ returning to the Gold
Standard’.
They also suggested that Attlee send a refutation of such criticisms to Bevin
(( Attlee to Tom Attlee 15 Aug. 1944, Attlee papers MSS Eng. c. 4793, Bodleian Library,
Oxford.
() PRO CAB 65}51 WM(45)9 (confidential annex); Alan Bullock, The life and times of Ernest
Bevin, ii : Minister of labour, – (London, 1967), pp. 350–1.
(* Pressnell, External economic policy, i, pp. 194, 197, 201.
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‘who is, as you know, greatly influenced by this line of thought’.)! The
chancellor in the same month launched an ‘educational campaign’, meeting
both Pethick-Lawrence and a (separate) group of Labour M.P.s to explain
the proposals.)" James Meade, moreover, in an undated (and perhaps
uncirculated) memorandum, offered a broader philosophical counterblast to
the point of view which argued for unrestricted freedom to pursue bilateralist
arrangements : ‘Only a madman could argue that there is no loss of general
welfare or prosperity as a result of unlimited national sovereignty in economic
affairs. But…it may be argued by certain socialists that it is pointless to
attempt to regulate the behaviour of capitalisms and that the only solution is a
world socialist revolution.’ Yet, it might in fact be possible to work out a
satisfactory set of rules, supervised by appropriate international organizations,
to deal with questions such as exchange rates, tariffs, and the like, and to
establish machinery through which governments could consult over matters
such as employment policy, social security, and labour standards. If so, ‘Would
it be reasonable to argue that this country could do better for itself by
preserving its complete liberty of action, or that such [international] action
would be foredoomed to failure in a world in which important capitalist
economies remained?’)#
But the general mood within the party was one of scepticism. Bevin, who
confidently, but wrongly, expected to be chancellor in a future Labour
government, was still not convinced of the merits of Bretton Woods. He told the
Commons in June 1945, after the break up of the coalition
I will join with anyone in finding a rational basis for an international price level,
properly organised, provided it does not reflect itself in depressing the standard of life on
the home market. As yet, neither the Chancellor nor Lord Keynes has ever been able
to persuade me that there are sufficient safeguards in the Bretton Woods proposals to
achieve that object.)$
But the new Labour government, which took office in July, by the end of the
year ratified Bretton Woods. As Keynes had predicted, the majority of sceptics,
Bevin included, acquiesced when faced with the alternative – trying to survive
the post-war transition without United States aid.
XI
Dalton later recalled that, during the last months of 1945, as negotiations for
American financial help proceeded,
we retreated, slowly and with a bad grace and with increasing irritation, from a free gift
to an interest-free loan, and from this again to a loan bearing interest ; from a larger to
)! ‘Bretton Woods conference’, Piercy and Durbin to Attlee, 25 Jan 1945, Piercy papers 8}9.
)" JMK xxvi, p. 187.
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a smaller total of aid; and from the prospect of loose strings, some of which would be
only general declarations of intention, to the most unwilling acceptance of strings so
tight that they might strangle our trade and indeed, our whole economic life.)%
Almost the only bargaining counter that Britain had in her transactions with
the US was the threat that, if no loan was forthcoming, she would not ratify
Bretton Woods; and if Britain did not do so by 31 December 1945, the fund and
the bank would not be able to begin operations.)& But the USA in turn was able
to exploit Britain’s predicament to tie her to further multilateral objectives. On
commercial policy, these were broadly statements of intent : the Anglo-
American financial agreement, finally signed on 6 December, asserted that one
of the purposes of the loan was ‘ to assist the Government of the United
Kingdom to assume the obligations of multilateral trade’, and parliament was
in due course asked to welcome the initiative of the US government in putting
forward the ITO proposals.)’ But also, amongst the specific provisions, Britain
would by 31 December 1946 have to ensure that her use of quantitative trade
controls did not discriminate against the US. And, on the monetary side,
sterling would have to be made generally convertible for current transactions
within one year of the effective date of the agreement (i.e. by 15 July 1947, as
it turned out). The Labour cabinet, and parliament, accepted these
obligations ; but can it be argued that, by so doing, they easily fell in behind the
Atlanticist approach to trade and payments?
Booth believes so. He claims that the acceptance of the loan, compounded by
Bevin’s 1947 decision to press for the maximum possible amount of Marshall
aid for Britain, helped reconcile Labour opinion to the Atlanticist economic
agenda. However, he also argues that the ‘Atlanticist base…shaped Labour’s
foreign economic policy, but it did so because the majority of ministers could find
no real alternative’. This seems to contradict his own later claim that they were
easily converted to the American viewpoint. For, as Booth himself notes, ‘ the
Cabinet was extremely unenthusiastic ’ about the terms of the US loan.)( This
was certainly true in the case of Dalton, who, in the final analysis, was driven
by political considerations to accept it complete with strings. The alternative,
as he saw it, was ‘Less food…[and] practically no smokes, since eighty per cent
of our tobacco cost dollars…leading towards sure defeat at the next election’.))
According to ‘Otto’ Clarke, Dalton’s opinions ‘all boiled down to the view that
we should get the money quickly, whether the deal was good or bad’.)* Coming
as it did from a vociferous opponent of the loan, Clarke’s view was perhaps
biased; but it certainly encapsulated Dalton’s conviction, verging on des-
peration, that American help was essential at almost any cost.
The prime minister shared this opinion. ‘We had to have the loan’, Attlee
)% Dalton, High tide and after: memoirs, – (London, 1962), pp. 74–5.
)& See Gardner, Sterling-dollar diplomacy, p. 224.
)’ Cmnd. 6708, 6 Dec. 1945 ; Parliamentary Debates 5th series House of Commons vol. 417 12
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)) Dalton, High tide and after, p. 85. )* Clarke diary 26 Feb. 1946, Clarke papers 25.
210 richard toye
told Kenneth Harris in retirement. ‘We knew how much we risked when we
accepted convertibility, but Keynes urged us to take the risk – you see, he
believed profoundly in Free Trade.’*! The implication of this, of course, was
that Attlee shared no such belief ; but he had a reputation for deferring to the
experts in such matters, and in this case did so.*" Bevin, by contrast, has been
described by Booth as ‘ the likeliest supporter of Anglo–American economic co-
operation’ in 1945.*# Given Bevin’s prior attitude to Bretton Woods, it may be
seen that this is almost the reverse of the truth. Indeed, Booth himself
acknowledges that the foreign secretary could find little fervour for the loan. As
Douglas Jay, Attlee’s new personal assistant, later recalled
Bevin, like many of us, started the negotiations with a strong distaste for accepting any
help from the Americans or any conditions imposed by them. He used to march down
the corridor to the Cabinet Room at No. 10 each evening remarking loudly with a
broad grin: ‘Any danger of a settlement tonight? ’ But the stark realities of the situation
steadily impinged on his mind, and in the end the very fact that he had started from this
viewpoint gave him greater conviction and authority in his defence of the inevitable
loan.*$
In the Commons he completely reversed his position on Bretton Woods,
declaring himself satisfied that under the rules which had been laid down, the
problems of the gold standard years need never recur : ‘I feel that this is not the
gold standard.’*% Thus, if anyone now performed a volte face on external
economic policy, it was Bevin.
His about-turn meant the end of heavy-weight Labour opposition to the new
international settlement, but left-wing critics remained vocal. Shinwell, now
minister of fuel and power, told the cabinet that the loan was ‘ incompatible
with the successful operation of a planned economy in this country’ ; Aneurin
Bevan, minister of health, supported him.*& In the Commons, Jennie Lee,
Bevan’s wife, described the Anglo-American financial agreement as ‘a
niggardly, barbaric and antediluvian settlement’.*’ Labour backbencher
Richard Stokes said that the Americans were ‘extremely ignorant ’, and did
‘not understand the international trade problem’.*( Amazingly, Morrison, in
his role as leader of the House of Commons, had previously told a meeting of
the parliamentary Labour party of the government’s decision that ‘ should any
member who held strong views on this matter find it necessary to vote against
the Government’s proposals…disciplinary action would be inapplicable on
this occasion’.*) The rationale for this, presumably, was the same as that given
*! Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London, 1995), p. 275.
*" For Attlee’s reputation, see Howson and Moggridge, eds., The wartime diaries of Lionel Robbins
and James Meade, p. 124. *# Booth, British economic policy, p. 136.
*$ Douglas Jay, Change and fortune: a political record (London, 1980), p. 137.
*% Parliamentary Debates 5th series House of Commons vol. 417 13 Dec. 1945 col. 733.
*& PRO CAB 128}4 CM(45)57 (confidential annex).
*’ Parliamentary Debates 5th series House of Commons vol. 417, 13 Dec. 1945 col. 669.
*( Ibid., col. 709.
*) Minutes of a meeting of the parliamentary Labour party, 12 Dec. 1945, LPA.
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by the chancellor to James Callaghan MP when the latter expressed his
doubts about the loan settlement: ‘Hugh Dalton gave one of his portentous
winks. He did not mind, he said, if some of us voted against the loan and the
Agreement. It would show the Americans that the Labour Government was
not a pushover, and had its own domestic problems.’** In the end, the measure
was passed by 347 to 100, with most Tories abstaining and only twenty-three
Labour MPs (including Callaghan) voting against. Kenneth Harris has
written: ‘For better or worse [Britain] had tied her economic future to that of
the Americans.’"!!
XII
Although Harris’s statement contains an obvious measure of truth, Britain was
not, as a result, corralled into unqualified acceptance of the American agenda
on trade and payments. But, in 1945 and after, the Attlee government was
nevertheless faced with a dilemma. Francis Williams, the prime minister’s
former public relations adviser, in 1948 characterized this as ‘ the dilemma of
the dual necessity – the need to plan an economy which will fit into a world
pattern if that should still be possible but which will be capable of surviving if
no such pattern is restored’."!" This was a version of the ‘planning paradox’,
sharpened by circumstances. For Britain could only ensure her economic
survival by using American dollar aid to ease her dire foreign exchange
problem; but such aid would only be forthcoming on the basis of promises to
fit in with the Atlanticist ‘world pattern’. Yet these promises, if enacted, could
only weaken the country’s foreign exchange position once more.
There was, therefore, a strong temptation to the British to make com-
mitments, in particular, to the extension of multilateral trade, in line with the
aspirations that several Labour ministers had voiced during the war years. Yet
equally, there was every incentive to avoid putting such commitments into
practice in the short term. The behaviour this situation encouraged led to the
American accusation that the Labour government was not serious about
liberalization – or, to be more specific, about the forms of liberalization that
the Americans themselves favoured. The accusation was in some ways unfair.
But the fact that it was made tends to suggest that there was no warm embrace
of the Atlanticist position by Labour in the late 1940s ; rather, the party’s
actions in government were a product of tensions between competing practical
and ideological objectives. In attempting to ensure her own economic survival,
while keeping the path of future international co-operation open, Britain, in
Williams’s words, had ‘to ride two horses at the same time’."!#
There were, of course, strong US pressures to adopt the Atlanticist view
more wholeheartedly. These, especially over the question of international
payments, posed a potential danger to Labour’s domestic programme. Dalton
** James Callaghan, Time and chance (London, 1987), pp. 73–4.
"!! Harris, Attlee, p. 275.
"!" Francis Williams, The triple challenge: the future of socialist Britain (London, 1948), p. 170.
"!# Ibid.
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feared that to ask for sterling convertibility to be delayed would be to invite
American attempts to force Britain to abandon policies of nationalization and
improved social services."!$ But although thus sticking to the commitment to
make the pound freely convertible led directly to the crisis of July and August
1947, the paradoxical consequence of that episode, once convertibility had
been suspended again, was that the aim of sterling convertibility was put to one
side for the indefinite future – and meanwhile Labour stuck to its socialism at
home. At the same time, Britain received official US sanction, for the time
being, to discriminate against American goods in favour of non-dollar
suppliers."!% The episode highlights the difficulties Labour faced in fulfilling its
international and domestic promises at once; but the end result was no simple
caving in to the American view.
Equally, Roy Harrod, Keynes’s biographer, noting the government’s
preoccupations with domestic matters, recalled in 1959 that ‘distinguished
American officials ’ had told him that ‘once the war was over, the
British…seemed to show little interest in the development of the [Anglo-
American] war-time planning or in the international institutions that had been
set up’."!& This was doubtless true in part because those institutions showed no
signs of living up to the high hopes that Keynes, and indeed Labour thinkers
like Durbin and Piercy, had had for them."!’ But at the same time, the once-
held fear of Bevin and others, that the creation of the IMF and the World Bank
meant a return to the gold standard, and the subjection of domestic policies to
outside interference, was never fulfilled; in 1949 Britain was able to enact a
substantial devaluation of sterling, with no threat of direct outside intervention
to enforce deflationary policies.
Moreover, although Labour did not construct a planned economy at home,
this was not the result of the commitments over trade and payments on which
the US loan was conditional. Rather, Labour lacked the political will and the
economic apparatus to enact its (extremely vague) conception of socialist
planning. Indeed, ironically enough, given Shinwell’s criticism of the loan
agreement, the only attempt at long-range economic forecasting that the Attlee
government made was undertaken partly in order to please the Americans.
This, The long-term programme of the United Kingdom, was presented in 1948 as part
of Britain’s bid to secure Marshall aid. But in spite of the warm feelings towards
America generated by Marshall aid, there was no concomitant revolution in
Labour’s economic thought. This was especially true on commercial policy,
where the Americans continued to press for further multilateralism, but were
for the most part frustrated. As Tomlinson has argued, Britain responded to US
pressure on the basis of an overriding commitment to the Atlantic alliance, but
never gave more than was deemed politically inescapable to maintain that
alliance."!( That is to say, the government continued to ride two horses at once.
"!$ Dalton, High tide and after, p. 255. "!% Gardner, Sterling-dollar diplomacy, p. 336.
"!& Harrod, The prof: a personal memoir of Lord Cherwell (London, 1959), p. 249.
"!’ See Booth, British economic policy, p. 151. "!( Tomlinson, Democratic socialism, p. 35.
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This was in part the consequence of a continuing dichotomy in Labour
thought. Dalton and Attlee’s war-time support for commercial multilateralism
had been conditional on it being made compatible with continued state
trading. This attitude was sustained after 1945 by Stafford Cripps, who had
taken Dalton’s old posting as president of the board of trade. Early in 1946,
‘Otto’ Clarke noted that ‘Cripps (main advocate of the ITO policy) has now
come out for bulk purchase of cotton – which is quite illogical.’"!) Whether so
or not, the apparent contradiction was certainly in line with the policy that
Dalton had bequeathed from war-time days. Moreover, as chancellor after
1947, Cripps resisted moves towards non-discrimination firmly, even whilst
espousing it as an ideal to be pursued in the longer run. There is no reason to
think that his pronouncements that non-discriminatory multilateral trade
would be beneficial for Britain – when eventually put into practice at a much
later point – were made cynically."!* But his approach risked coming across as
hypocrisy, a case of ‘Give me chastity, oh Lord, but not yet.’ This, of course,
infuriated the Americans, who became convinced that ‘ the present Govern-
ment of the U.K., while giving lip service to the principles of multilateral trade,
really believes that Britain can never face free competition and must seek
sheltered markets through preferential arrangements, discriminatory bilateral
contracts, and barter deals. For that reason it has never wanted…the ITO to
be set up.’""!
In fact, owing to Congressional opposition, the ITO was still-born before the
question could be tested (the preliminary General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, signed in Geneva in 1947, survived). But it is certainly true that Britain
had serious doubts about signing up to the ITO. This is not to say, however,
that the American criticism was entirely reasonable ; for these doubts were
partly, and increasingly, a consequence of the US’s reluctance to match
British concessions by substantially lowering her own tariffs. Given this
reluctance, Labour ministers, in the tough economic conditions that they
faced, were more than willing to depart from multilateral trade policies. This
was because the adoption of multilateral trade would weaken Britain’s ability
to control its foreign exchange position, thus leading towards devaluation.
And, although senior Labour politicians had argued during war-time that
under the new international system there should be the right to substantial
devaluation, they did not want to exercise that right, not least because this
would unfairly diminish the value of the huge sterling balances accumulated
during the war by countries such as India. This in turn might trigger demands
for immediate repayment. Thus Dalton remarked during the 1949 sterling
crisis, shortly before the government was forced to bow to the devaluation that
was in fact inevitable, that in the absence of ‘big ’ financial assistance from the
"!) Clarke diary 6 Mar. 1946, Clarke papers 25.
"!* Tomlinson, Democratic socialism, p. 35. See also Marguerite Dupree, ed., Lancashire and
Whitehall : the diary of Sir Raymond Streat, ii : – (Manchester, 1987), p. 316.
""! FRUS 1948, vol. i, p. 878.
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US, ‘we must fight our way through without [the Americans]…making
bilateral deals with whoever we can’."""
Such considerations help explain why, by 1950, over half of all British
imports were still subject to government control. Nevertheless, over 95 per cent
of imports had been controlled at the end of the war; so there had also been
significant degree of liberalization in this area. The progress towards the 1950
level was in large part attributable to the previous year’s agreement between
the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) countries to
work to cut away quota restrictions between them – which agreement was itself
the result of a British initiative.""# This was consistent with the line laid out in
Full employment and financial policy in 1944. It was also consistent with the ‘dual
necessity ’ outlined by Williams – for it was an attempt to build up closely
integrated trade with a small group of non-dollar nations as a basis for limited
prosperity in case the hoped-for ‘world pattern’ did not emerge. In other
words, this form of liberalization developed as an alternative to Atlanticism.
Moreover, many Labour ministers were concerned, even on this basis, to see
that liberalization did not go too far. In January 1950, Gaitskell, Shinwell’s
replacement as minister of fuel and power, won support from Dalton, Bevan,
John Strachey, and Harold Wilson, as well as some agreement from Cripps,
when he argued that ‘Exchange control and import controls will be necessary,
permanently, as vital instruments of policy’ (although Gaitskell’s position
afterwards altered).""$
It is therefore clear that Labour had not straightforwardly fallen in with the
Atlanticist view as interpreted by the Americans. Dalton and others did not
perform a volte face in the 1940s ; rather, they achieved consistency in
ambiguity. High enthusiasm for monetary and commercial multilateralism
(the latter of which was for a time Dalton’s pet project) in 1943–4 was matched
by the simultaneous advocacy of exchange controls, import controls and state
trading. The acceptance of the Atlanticist provisions of Bretton Woods in 1945
was twinned with the pursuit of a domestic programme of dedicated socialist
intent. And subsequently, the credibility of the continued, and undoubtedly
genuine, Labour aspiration to international economic co-operation was called
into question, in US eyes at least, by the party’s dogged defence of Britain’s
discriminatory privileges. Bevin, in some ways, was an exception from this
general rule of ambiguity, in that he went from downright opposition to
Bretton Woods, to expedient support of the loan and its conditions, to early and
""" Cited in Brett, Gilliatt, and Pople, ‘Planned trade, Labour party policy and US
intervention’, History Workshop, 13 (1982), pp. 130–42.
""# J. C. R. Dow, The management of the British economy, – (Cambridge, 1964), pp. 154,
50.
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outright enthusiasm for most aspects of the Atlantic alliance. Yet even he
continued occasionally to voice ‘carpet-slipper’ thoughts on international
economic questions – suggesting, for example, that America should open Fort
Knox and distribute its ‘useless ’ gold to the world – in a way guaranteed to
infuriate US opinion.""%
Labour policy, therefore, retained vital contradictions. The example of
‘ international planning’ may thus be taken as evidence in favour of the
argument made by Booth that, in spite of the alleged sophistication of Labour’s
post-1931 programme, such preparation proved of dubious value once the
party was actually in government after 1945.""& During the war, international
economic issues had been discussed within the party to an unprecedented
degree; Labour ministers had been privy to cabinet discussions on these
questions, and had had increased access to expert advice. Yet by the time that
Labour took power, the party’s desire for international economic co-operation
was still in conflict with key aspects of its wider socialist aspiration: the
‘planning paradox’ had not been resolved. As Attlee himself put it in
November 1946 : ‘In certain specific points of world economic planning, we
find the United States in agreement with us, but, generally speaking, they hold
a capitalist philosophy which we do not accept.’""’ For this reason alone, the
post-war Labour government’s full acceptance of the Atlanticist international
economic agenda was never likely.
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